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Grounds for Asylum: How Victims' Rights Laws Confer 
Particular Social Group Status to Domestic Violence Victims 
Jordan Cotleur1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Eliza,2 a native of El Salvador, is seeking asylum in the 
United States. She sought refuge by swimming across the Rio 
Grande River with her six-year-old son and two nephews. I first met 
Eliza while preparing for her credible fear interview, where the 
government decides whether she has a reasonable prima facie case 
that makes it plausible she could be granted asylum. Eliza insisted 
she left El Salvador because of firsthand gang violence and 
extortion. Knowing that anti-gang political opinion does not fare 
well in U.S. asylum cases, I pressed Eliza to tell me more about her 
life in El Salvador. When I offered to call home, Eliza became 
incredibly emotional. It became clear that, like many married 
women in El Salvador, Eliza was most fearful of returning home 
because of the violence she would suffer at the hands of her ex-
husband. 
Despite an uptake in legislation criminalizing domestic 
violence since the 1990’s, women in Latin America still face the 
highest rates of gender-based and domestic violence of any region 
in the world.3 In Central America, two-thirds of female homicide 
victims are killed because of their status as a woman (also known as 
“femicide”) and half of women face this fate at the hands of a current 
or former partner.4 The violence perpetuates at such an alarming rate 
 
1 Associate Member (2020), Immigration and Human Rights Law Review 
2 Name has been changed to maintain privacy and confidentiality.  
3 Leonie Rauls & Tamar Ziff, High Rates of Violence Against Women in Latin 
America Despite Femicide Legislation: Possible Steps Forward, THE DIALOGUE 
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2018/10/high-rates-of-
violence-against-women-in-latin-america-despite-femicide-legislation-possible-
steps-forward/. 
4 Sebastián Essayag (Regional Coordinator of Violence Against Women and 
Girls, Femicide and Citizen Security Projects at UNDP RBLAC), From 
Commitment to Action: Policies to End Violence Against Women in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, at 11(2017). 
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because investigations into gender-based violence are nearly non-
existent in the region.5 In 2016, it was reported that up to ninety-
eight percent of cases involving femicide and violence against 
women and girls in Latin America went unpunished.6 
Despite the prevalence of gender-based persecution, or 
maybe in spite of it, in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
(“Sessions”) explicitly held that victims of domestic violence do not 
qualify for asylum because they are not considered to be members 
of a “particular social group.”7 Despite Sessions’ ruling in Matter of 
A-B-, the question of whether or not victims of domestic violence 
constitute members of a particular social group for purposes of 
asylum continues to invoke legal debate. This article attempts to 
navigate domestic violence’s place in asylum law by comparing the 
emergence and scope of victims’ rights laws to that of asylum law. 
The language, structure, and scope of victims’ rights laws in the 
United States and international legal institutions support the idea 
that “[v]ictims of crime and victims of human rights abuses are 
recognized in this instrument as sharing similar needs and requiring 
similar protections.”8 
 International norms now acknowledge that victims’ rights 
are considered human rights.9 Based on the intersection of human 
rights and victims’ rights movements, I posit that victims’ rights 
laws are a quintessential consideration in determining whether a 
class of people constitutes a particular social group. Victims’ rights 
laws themselves offer the requisite clarity, visibility and 
particularity needed to validate domestic violence victims as 
members of a particular social group.   
 Part II of this article will define domestic violence and 
asylum in the United States, focusing on what groups qualify as a 
“particular social group” and how courts have responded to the 
 
5 RAULS & ZIFF, supra note 3. 
6Id.      
7 Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
8 VERÓNICA MICHEL, PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
IN LATIN AMERICA 41 (2018). [emphasis added] 
9 Id. 
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narrow definition articulated in Matter of A-B-. Part III explores the 
victims’ rights movement by defining victims’ rights law, analyzing 
how they emerged, and discussing what these laws look like across 
international, regional, and national platforms.  Drawing on ways 
that victims’ rights laws emerged and normalized, Part IV identifies 
how the existence of victims’ rights laws is a sufficient basis for 
granting domestic violence victims “particular social group” status. 
This analysis explores both the normative similarities between 
asylum and victims’ rights, as well as legal requirements of social 
distinction, particularity, and immutability necessary to establish 
membership in a particular social group. Additionally, Part V will 
address some of the counterarguments that arise from this 
discussion.   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Defining Domestic Violence 
 
The National Domestic Violence Hotline defines domestic 
violence as “a pattern of behaviors used by one partner to maintain 
power and control over another partner in an intimate 
relationship.”10 The criminalization of domestic violence is a 
relatively modern policy in the United States that emerged in the 
1970’s, and it remains non-existent as a criminal matter in many 
countries around the world.11 Victims of domestic violence have 
historically faced difficulty obtaining protection from the criminal 
legal system because it was long viewed as a “private family 
matter.”12 Unsurprisingly, Sessions relies on the categorization of 
this type of crime as “private criminal activity” to justify his ruling 
 
10 What is Domestic Violence? NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ (last visited Nov. 4, 
2019). 
11 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 3 (1996) [hereinafter “DOJ 
Report”], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf. 
12 Id. at 7. 
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in Matter of A-B-.13 Indeed, the private nature of domestic violence 
makes it significantly more dangerous and difficult to escape than 
stranger-based private criminal activity because victims and 
offenders often “occupy the same space, share and compete for 
resources, and have emotional ties,” and the threats of violence are 
“real, immediate, and ongoing.”14 
 Definitions of domestic violence have also changed over the 
years and continue to vary between countries and even within 
different jurisdictions in the United States. States impose different 
restrictions on what type of abuse, i.e. emotional, financial, 
psychological, or physical, may qualify as domestic violence, and 
states also require varying degrees of evidence to bring charges.15 
Immigration, however, is regulated by the federal government so, 
for purposes of this article, the federal definition is relevant and 
controlling. The federal government defines domestic violence as “a 
pattern of behaviors used by one partner to maintain power and 
control over another partner in an intimate relationship.”16 The 
federal government recognizes qualifying behaviors as those carried 
out through physical, sexual, emotional, economic, and/or 
psychological abuse, and/or threats, stalking, and cyberstalking.17 
Victims of domestic violence can include spouses, intimate partners, 
family members, children, and cohabitants.18 In reaching this 
comprehensive definition, the U.S. government has developed 
various governmental agencies and federal legislation to address the 
dangers domestic violence poses to individuals and society at large. 
The U.S. Department of Justice has an Office on Violence Against 
Women (OVW) which leads the national effort to reduce violence 
against women and “administer justice for and strengthen services 
 
13 Matter of A-B-, supra note 7, at 343.  
14 DOJ Report, supra note 11, at 29. 
15 State Domestic Violence Laws, FINDLAW, 
https://family.findlaw.com/domestic-violence/what-is-domestic-violence.html 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
16 What Is Domestic Violence? supra note 10.  
17 State Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 15.  
18 Id. 
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to victims.”19 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against 
Women Act (“VAWA”) making certain domestic violence offenses 
a federal crime.20 Additionally, VAWA provides undocumented 
immigrants who are the victims of domestic violence in the United 
States a path to apply for legal permanent residency, or a “green 
card.”21 While this provision signifies an attempt to provide 
comprehensive coverage to domestic violence victims, many have 
found shortcomings in the bifurcation that is based on whether the 
abuse occurred inside or outside the United States.   
 “Intimate partner violence” is the United Nations’ preferred 
terminology for domestic violence, and it is defined by the World 
Health Organization as “behavior by an intimate partner or ex-
partner that causes physical, sexual or psychological harm, 
including physical aggression, sexual coercion, psychological abuse 
and controlling behaviors.”22 Albeit discrepancies in the details of 
what type of behavior may be considered “controlling,” most 
jurisdictions recognize domestic violence broadly as an abuse of 
power, beyond just physical aggression, that exists within an 
intimate or formerly intimate relationship. Further, gender-neutral 
language such as “partner” and “spouse” supports the widely 
accepted fact that domestic violence is perpetuated by men and 
women, and that it occurs across both homosexual and heterosexual 
relationships.23 Although this article specifically focuses on 
domestic violence perpetrated against women, this is not intended 
to discount or minimize the experiences of male victims of domestic 
violence. Rather, this distinction is necessary to underscore the 
societal norms that make women inherently vulnerable to domestic 
violence because of their status as women.  
 
19 Office on Violence Against Women, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ovw (last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
20 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925-14045 (1994) [hereinafter 
“VAWA”]. 
21 Id. 
22 Violence against women, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
23 Id. 
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B. Defining Asylum  
 
 Per the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), asylum status is available to individuals who (1) meet the 
definition of a refugee, (2) are already in the United States, and (3) 
are seeking admission at a port of entry.24 For all intents and 
purposes, an asylee is a refugee who is already in the United States. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee as 
someone who is unwilling or unable to return to their home country 
based on fear of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”25 Four of the 
protected classes (race, religion, nationality and political opinion) 
are relatively identifiable and do not require substantial litigation to 
define them. “Membership in a particular social group,” on the other 
hand, serves as a “catch all” for other immutable characteristics that 
do not fit neatly into one of the other categories. “Particular social 
group” is thus, the crux upon which domestic violence victims’ 
claims for asylum rely. Notably, “[t]he INA does not define 
‘persecution on account of. . . membership in a particular social 
group.’”26   
A progeny of disheveled cases led Sessions in Matter of A-
B- to articulate a standard for what an applicant must demonstrate to 
establish persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group.27 The respondent in Matter of A-B- is an El Salvadoran 
woman who sought asylum in the United States as a member of the 
particular social group “El Salvadoran women who are unable to 
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in 
 
24 Refugees & Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum (last visited Nov. 24, 
2019). 
25 8 U.S. Code §1101(a)(42). 
26 Matter of A-B-, supra note 7, at 318. 
27 Id. 
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common.”28 A-B- fled her home in El Salvador after years of 
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse at the hands of her ex-
husband, whom she could not escape from even after securing a 
divorce.29 In reaching his decision, Sessions reiterated that an 
applicant must show that the requisite group is “composed of 
members who share a common immutable characteristic, defined 
with particularity, and socially distinct within the society in 
question.”30 Despite the addition of the particularity and social 
distinction requirements, Sessions did not relinquish the assertion 
that a shared characteristic could be “an innate one such as sex, 
color, or kindship ties. . . or it might be a shared past experience.”31 
However, Sessions did assert that “a particular social group must 
‘exist independently’ of the harm asserted in an application for 
asylum. . . ”32 The remaining guidelines promulgated by this 
decision seem to simply reiterate fundamental provisions of the 
INA, such as the fact that applicants must demonstrate that 
membership in the group is a central reason for the persecution, and 
that when the alleged persecutor is unaffiliated with the government, 
the applicant must show that her home government is unwilling or 
unable to protect her.33   
Prior to Sessions’ decision, Matter of A-R-C-G- was the 
seminal case governing domestic violence as grounds for asylum. 
There, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held “‘married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’ can 
constitute a cognizable social group” for purposes of being granted 
asylum in the U.S.34 Sessions explicitly overruled Matter of A-R-C-
G-, finding that victims of domestic violence do not qualify as 
members of a particular social group.35  
 
28 Id. at 321. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 317. 
31 Id. at 318 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). 
32 Id. at 334 (citing Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 236 (BIA 2014)). 
33 Id. Much of the remainder of the decision in A-B- is criticized as dicta. See 
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.Supp.3d 96, 116 (D.C. 2018). 
34 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014). 
35 Matter of A-B-, supra note 7, at 317. 
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 While Matter of A-B- arguably offered some clarity on what 
constitutes a “particular social group,” it may have done so in an 
unconstitutional manner. In the relatively short time since Matter of 
A-B- was handed down, there has been little in the way of 
substantive case law discussing its implications. The most notable 
discussion of A-B- takes place in the D.C. District Court decision of 
Grace v. Whitaker, which theoretically abrogated Matter of A-B-.36 
Although Grace challenges the application of Matter of A-B- to the 
credible fear stage of proceedings rather than the asylum context, 
the decision nevertheless provides some insight into how courts may 
apply Matter of A-B- going forward.37   
 Grace, a native of Guatemala, fled her country after having 
been raped, beaten, and threatened for over two years by her 
domestic partner.38 Grace’s children were also subject to beatings, 
sexual assault, and death threats by her persecuting partner.39 Like 
many women in her position, Grace had no protection in the 
authorities in her country as they worked in concert with her 
persecutor to evict her from her home when she sought help.40 While 
Grace was the named plaintiff, there were a total of twelve plaintiffs, 
adults and children, with painfully similar experiences.41  
According to the court in Grace, “[a] general rule that 
effectively bars [] claims based on the category of abusers (i.e. 
domestic abusers or gang members). . . is inconsistent with 
Congress’ intent to bring the United States refugee law into 
conformance with the [Refugee Protocol].”42 The Court found that 
a categorical ban on domestic violence claims at the credible fear 
stage is “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to the 
individualized analysis required by the INA.”43 Although the 
 
36 Grace, supra note 33. 
37 Id. at 105.  
38 Id. at 111-12. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 126. 
43 Id.  
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holding in Grace is only binding over the credible fear stage, the 
decision nevertheless provides over one hundred pages of legal 
criticism of the decision in A-B-, which likely will be taken note of 
by federal courts going forward.  Moreover, the credible fear stage 
functions to give individuals with potential asylum claims a chance 
to remain in the United States to fight their asylum claims. This 
decision effectively allows asylum-seekers with domestic violence 
claims to “pass” the credible fear stage, indicating that there must 
be some chance for such claims to be viable in an actual asylum case 
down the road.    
 
III. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS 
 
Victims’ rights laws provide tangible legal rights to victims of 
crime. Domestic violence victims have both implicit and explicit 
rights embedded in victims’ rights law.44 While the purpose of this 
article is to analyze the scope of victims’ rights laws afforded 
specifically to victims of domestic violence, it is necessary to first 
analyze the movement as a whole to understand the purpose, scope, 
and clarity of the victims’ rights laws afforded specifically to 
domestic violence victims. 
 
A. Historical Emergence of International Norms 
 
Victims’ rights laws emerged in tandem with the human 
rights movement and the international norms governing refugees 
and asylees. Moreover, victims’ rights laws reflect a domestic and 
international movement to better understand the victim as a “person 
with interests and needs beyond restitution.”45 Such laws emerged, 
in part, to prevent cases from falling into impunity where the state 
has failed, “either by commission or by omission,” to adequately 
prosecute the crime.46   
 
44 VAWA, supra note 20. 
45 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 41. 
46 Id. at 3. 
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A historical dive into this movement reveals that the victims’ 
rights movement and the human rights movement are far from 
mutually exclusive. The widespread trauma brought to light by the 
Second World War is credited with triggering the expansion of both 
victims’ rights and human rights’ laws.47 In the second half of the 
twentieth century, the world saw a need to protect victims from evil 
acts committed, or at the very least ignored, by state actors. The 
result was an international human rights movement focused on 
liberalism and state compliance with international human rights 
laws, supplemented by a victims’ rights movement to normalize the 
recognition and protection of victims.48   
The Second World War brought state facilitated persecution 
on the basis of race, religion, and nationality. In the wake of these 
atrocities, international agreements were quickly adopted to address 
the globalized outrage, including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (“UDHR”) in 1948 and the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees in 1951.49 The UDHR was the first legislation 
of its kind to recognize the human right to be free from various 
capacities of victimhood. The fundamental overlap between the two 
aforementioned international agreements supports the conclusion 
that victims’ rights emerged from an effort to protect those 
populations that were the intended beneficiaries of international 
asylum and refugee laws. Today the umbrella of the international 
victims’ rights movement encompasses the facets of the women’s 
rights movement that are fighting injustices such as domestic 
violence.50 
Although the victims’ rights movement has moved 
simultaneously with human rights movements since the 1950’s, it 
finally landed on international codification in 1985 through the 
 
47 Id. at 39. 
48 Id. at 39-40. 
49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 
217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948); 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.2/108 (1951), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954). 
50 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 37. 
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enactment of the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (hereafter, Basic 
Principles).51 The Basic Principles’ broad interpretation of what 
constitutes a victim underscores the fact that victims of crime and 
victims of human rights abuses by the state “shar[e] similar needs 
and requir[e] similar protections.”52 The United Nations has adopted 
multiple measures since 1985 to further expand victims’ rights.53 
The practical applicability of these norms is evident when one       
compares the absence of participatory rights for victims at the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 
mid 1990’s to the 2002 Rome Statute, which allows victims to 
actively participate in criminal proceedings through independent 
legal representation at the International Criminal Court.54  
International law categorizes victims’ rights laws into 
protection rights, reparation rights, and participation rights, each of 
which may vary in scope and implementation across and within 
different jurisdictions.55 The next two sections will explore the 
specific intricacies of how the victims’ rights movement has 
developed in the United States and Latin America. 
 
B. U.S. Victims’ Rights Laws 
 
The United States has seemingly embraced the victims’ 
rights movement since the beginning of the twenty-first century.  In 
2004, the federal government adopted the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act (“CVRA”) which articulates a standard set of rights for federal 
 
51 Id. at 40; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, adopted 29 Nov. 1985, U.N. GAOR, 40th 
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34(1985). 
52 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 41. 
53 Id. These measures include The Set of Principles for the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (1997); A 
Handbook on Justice for Victims by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (1999); and The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation (2006). 
54 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 42. 
55 Id. 
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crime victims      including access to information, protection, and 
participation in the criminal justice process.56  But by 2004, VAWA, 
the victims’ rights measure specifically for domestic violence 
victims, had already been in effect for nearly ten years.57 VAWA 
grants federal domestic violence victims the right (a) to be treated 
with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy; 
(b) to be reasonably protected from the accused offender; (c) to be 
notified of court proceedings; (d) to be present at all public court 
proceedings; (e) to confer with the attorney for the Government in 
the case; (f) to seek restitution; and (g) to obtain information about 
the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release of the 
offender.58 All states and the District of Columbia have a statutory 
provision that provides rights and protection for victims of domestic 
violence, and many states have provisions that are nearly 
synonymous with the federal statute.59 
Notably, most state victims’ rights laws include a provision 
denoting victims as having the right to protection in criminal 
proceedings. This caveat will serve as an important distinction in the 
analysis of how domestic violence victims are a sufficiently 
particularized social group.  
Many states are currently working to expand victims’ rights 
laws even further through the implementation of “Marsy’s 
Law.”60The law’s mission is to pass “constitutionally guaranteed 
crime victims’ rights.”61 Marsy’s Law is named after Marsalee 
(Marsy) Ann Nicholas, who was stalked and killed by her ex-
boyfriend in 1983.62  On the day of Marsy’s funeral, her mother was 
 
56 Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §3771 (2004). 
57 VAWA, supra note 20.  
58 Id.  
59 About Victims’ Rights, VICTIMLAW, 
https://victimlaw.org/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited Nov. 24, 
2019). 
60 State Efforts, MARSY’S LAW, https://www.marsyslaw.us/states (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019). 
61 Id. 
62 About Marsy’s Law, MARSY’S LAW, 
https://www.marsyslaw.us/about_marsys_law (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).  It is 
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confronted at the supermarket by the murderer.63 As they received 
no notification from the justice system, Marsy’s family had no idea 
that her murderer had been released on bail just days after her 
murder.64 From this experience, Marsy’s family became advocates 
for victims’ rights, championing the comprehensive Marsy’s Law in 
states across the nation.  Currently, Marsy’s Law is in the works in 
seven states “with more on the horizon.”65 While the 
constitutionality of Marsy’s Law remains to be litigated, the effort 
itself is indicative of the value that Americans see in protecting 
victims’ rights, specifically for domestic violence victims.   
 
C. Victims’ Rights Laws in Latin America 
 
 Despite “weakening democratic institutions, increasing 
violence, and eroding rule of law,” the victims’ rights movement has 
had a surprising impact in Latin America.66 In 1994, states adopted 
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belém do 
Pará”) in a monumental move to generate greater state responsibility 
for violence against women in Latin America and the Caribbean.67 
As of 2019, the Convention of Belém do Pará has been adopted and 
ratified by nearly every Latin American and Caribbean State, with 
Cuba being the only exception.68 The Convention of Belém do Pará 
calls on states to “condemn all forms of violence against women and 
agree to adopt. . . policies to prevent, punish and end the mentioned 
 
worth noting that, although Marsy’s law is a bill for crime victims generally, 
Marsy was the victim of domestic violence as she was killed by a former 
intimate partner.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 State Efforts, supra note 60. 
66 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 3. 
67 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women, “Convention of Belém do Pará,” adopted 9 June 
1994, OAS/Ser.L.V/II.92/doc.31 rev.3 (1994) (not in force), reprinted in 33 
I.L.M. 1534 (1994). 
68 ESSAYAG, supra note 4, at 15. 
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violence. . .”69 A number of Latin American countries have 
attempted to bring themselves into compliance with their obligations 
by adopting “private prosecution” measures.70 The right to private 
prosecution is a criminal procedure right granted to victims which 
essentially allows the victim’s lawyer to intervene during the 
hearings and trial and challenge the prosecutor when he or she is 
acting against the interests of the victim.71 
In her book, “Prosecutorial Accountability and Victims’ 
Rights in Latin America,” Verónica Michel theorizes that while 
victims of crime or victims of state abuse continue to deal with 
perpetrator impunity in many Latin American countries, the unique 
statutory right to “private prosecution” in this region provides a 
“legal opportunity structure” for crime victims to assert their 
rights.72 Private prosecution allows the victim to actively participate 
in the criminal prosecution, “either as an autonomous private 
prosecutor. . . or as an auxiliary private prosecutor.”73 The definition 
of a victim may vary across jurisdictions, but it is minimally defined 
to broadly encompass all “person(s) directly offended by the 
crime.”74 Although Latin America is one of the most dangerous 
regions in the world for violence against women, fourteen out of the 
seventeen countries in the region have codified “private 
prosecution” and recognize victims of crime as “rights bearers.”75 
The widespread statutory right to private prosecution is reflective of 
the value that Latin America gives to crime victims.  Therefore, even 
in a region where impunity from the law is rampant, the fact that 
there is even a law on the books for victims to overcome this 
impunity through “self-help” measures is indicative of the power of 
victims’ rights laws as an international norm.   
 
69 Convention of Belé, do Pará, supra note 67, art. 7.  
70 MICHEL, supra note 8.  
71 Id. at 4-5. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 51. 
74 Id. at 52.  
75 RAULS & ZIFF, supra note 3; MICHEL, supra note 8, at 33. 
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Further, a “second generation” of laws in Latin America has 
materialized out of the Convention of Belém do Pará to “typify the 
various forms of violence against women.”76 While accounting for 
the inherent diversity among the “social group of women,” these 
laws are significant because they identify and particularize the 
different societal circumstances that make women vulnerable to 
violence in different ways.77 These laws take into account 
characteristics such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, marital 
status, age group, education, and deprivations of liberty, to name a 
few, that increase the likelihood of violence when coupled with 
gender.78 The second generation laws recognize that gender-based 
violence is perpetuated by a variety of patriarchal norms that 
subordinate women to a second-class citizenry. Moreover, the 
second-generation laws increasingly emphasize the value of the 
victims’ rights, particularly through comprehensive care initiatives 
and access to justice.79 
Finally, victims’ rights have expanded at the same time that 
many Latin American countries have shifted from criminal 
procedure models that are entirely inquisitorial to “mixed models” 
that have some elements of both the inquisitorial and adversarial 
systems.80 The inquisitorial model relies on an extensive pre-trial 
inquiry by officials of the judicial system to ascertain the truth 
whereas the adversarial model rests on the presumption that the 
competition between the prosecution and the defense will generate 
the truth. Although inquisitorial systems tend to provide greater 
reparation and participation rights to victims than their adversarial 
counterparts, the newly crafted “mixed models” have proven to 
maintain the higher degree of victims’ rights that accompany an 
inquisitorial system while also benefiting from the efficiency of the 
adversarial process.81 The resulting model is European in nature, 
 
76 ESSAYAG, supra note 4, at 15. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 15-16. 
79 Id. 
80 MICHEL, supra note 8, at 46. 
81 Id. at 46-47. 
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giving rise to victims’ rights laws in the region that are heavily 
influenced by international legal and human rights norms.82   
 
IV. HOW VICTIMS’ RIGHTS LAWS CONFER 
“PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” STATUS TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
 
A. Common Intent and Purpose  
 
Asylum law is a direct result of the human rights movement, 
which emerged simultaneously with the victims’ rights movement. 
Accordingly, this three-dimensional intersection reflects the need 
for domestic violence victims to be granted substantive asylum 
protections as victims of human rights abuses who have tangible 
rights. Not only were victims’ rights and human rights-inspired 
asylum laws born in response to a common theme of injustice 
following World War II, they were also adopted with the common 
purposes of criminalizing abusers and bringing justice and 
protection to victims. The United States specifically adopted asylum 
laws to bring the United States’ domestic laws in line with 
international standards.83 Congress enacted the Refugee Act in order 
to codify the “‘national commitment to human rights and 
humanitarian concerns,’ and ‘to afford a generous standard for 
protection in cases of doubt.’”84 Victims’ rights laws aim to prevent 
“secondary victimization,” or “any additional suffering incurred by 
victims caused by the institutional response of the offense.”85 
Indeed, the Refugee Act of 1980 explicitly states that the purpose is 
to “respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in 
their homelands, including. . . humanitarian assistance for their care 
and maintenance in asylum areas.”86 With these two principal 
purposes in mind, it logically follows that victims’ rights laws and 
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asylum law have the same fundamental foundation and ultimate 
objectives.   
Moreover, the victims’ rights movement exemplifies a 
societal shift in classifying domestic violence as a public concern, 
like human rights violations, not just a private issue. Former U.S. 
Attorney General Sessions relies on the private nature of domestic 
violence, in part, to justify the decision in Matter of A-B-.87 
However, the United States and many countries in Latin America 
have adopted specific legislation to contradict this assertion. In Latin 
America, the second-generation laws recognize that violence against 
women in the private sphere is perpetuated in the public domain as 
well through the pressures of armed conflict and gang-related 
operations.88 In the United States, VAWA signifies an attempt by 
the federal government to bring “what was [once] a private 
experience into the public realm.”89 Under VAWA, domestic 
violence is unequivocally recognized as a public sphere issue that 
“our society will not tolerate.”90 The decision to bring the crime of 
domestic violence into the public sphere parallels the move to 
publicly condemn human rights violations in the international 
sphere following WWII.   
Where two movements are unequivocally intertwined in 
origin, purpose, and intent, it generates pause in the legal sphere 
when the two movements diverge in scope after decades of 
conformity. In the United States, federal legislation bifurcated 
asylum law and victims’ rights laws just prior to the turn of the 
century. Despite the passage of VAWA in 1994, in 1996, Congress 
revised portions of the original Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) under the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
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Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”).91 The revisions, in part, sought to 
deter candidates for asylum from utilizing asylum as a means of 
entry into the United States.92 This policy shift was triggered in part 
by growing fears of terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center 
Bombings and the increase in the number of Latin-American 
immigrants fleeing civil wars in the 80’s and 90’s.93 The 1996 INA 
revisions demonstrate a divergence between U.S. asylum law and 
the fundamental objective of the refugee protocol.  Furthermore, the 
passage of VAWA exemplifies how the United States treats 
domestic violence victims differently based on whether their abuse 
occurred in the United States or outside the borders.94 This 
distinction is at odds with international obligations to protect under 
the Refugee Act and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. 
Therefore, since the current trajectory of asylum law in the United 
States is running contradictory to congressional intent, intense 
scrutiny is necessary to ensure that such laws are accomplishing 
their original purpose and objective.  
  
B. Victims’ Rights Laws Create “Social Distinction” 
 
 Victims’ rights laws allow domestic violence victims to 
satisfy the social visibility requirement for “particular social group” 
because “a special protection law” tailored to the characteristics of 
a particular class of individuals is the most compelling evidence that 
such a class is uniquely and identifiably vulnerable.95 In Matter of 
A-B-, Sessions held that asylum applicants claiming membership in 
a particular social group must show, as one prerequisite, that the 
group is “socially distinct within the society in question.”96 Sessions 
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rejected the classification of “El Salvadoran women who are unable 
to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in 
common” as members of a particular social group, in part, because 
this group “lack[ed] sufficient social distinction to be cognizable as 
a distinct social group.”97 In reaching this conclusion, Sessions 
wrongfully rejected the fact that there are laws in place in El 
Salvador criminalizing domestic violence as indicative of 
cognizable recognition of this group by society at large.98   
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Henriquez-Rivas v. 
Holder found that the BIA “misapplied its own precedent” in finding 
that the group “Salvadoran witnesses who testified against gang 
members” did not satisfy the social distinction requirement for 
particular social group status.99 In holding, on rehearing en banc, 
that Salvadoran witnesses who testified against gang members did 
constitute a particular social group, the Court articulated two 
important principles for social distinctiveness.100   
First, the Court held that “on-sight visibility” (meaning the 
common characteristic of the group must be visible to the naked eye) 
is not required to establish social distinction.101 The Court reasoned, 
in part, that witnesses who testify against the cartel are inherently 
incentivized to stay out of public view for fear of reprisal from the 
gangs.102 Furthermore, the Court noted that anti-cartel informants 
might not have on-sight visibility to the public, but they would be 
socially visible, “particularly to the revenge seeking cartel 
members” from whom they fear persecution.103   
Second, the Court pointed out the pertinence of the fact that 
“Salvadoran society recognizes the unique vulnerability of people 
who testify against gang members.”104 Most notably, the Court 
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relies on the fact that the Salvadoran government enacted a specific 
law in 2006 to protect witnesses who testify against gangs and other 
violent criminal activity.105 El Salvador’s special witness protection 
law provides concrete evidence that society at large viewed this 
group as uniquely vulnerable and thus, they had social distinction. 
The law states, “the current El Salvadoran reality evidences the 
necessity that victims, witnesses and others who are involved in… 
judicial proceedings. . . should be protected to avoid violations of 
their rights. . .”106  
 Much like the testifying witness in El Salvador, the victim 
of domestic violence is now recognized by most Latin American 
states as a “rights bearing subject who possesses explicit rights that 
are protected by statute.”107 Therefore, where a country has 
domestic laws in place that go beyond just criminalizing domestic 
violence to actually protect and offer substantial rights to victims, 
these victims have cognizable rights that are socially distinct in the 
society in which they live. As discussed in the previous section, 
most countries in Latin America (with the minor exceptions of 
Colombia, Peru and Uruguay) have enacted laws that protect victims 
of domestic violence and theoretically give such victims access to 
private prosecution.108 Therefore, under the precedent established 
by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, Matter of A-B- was wrongly decided 
as it pertains to the lack of social distinctiveness that victims of 
domestic violence hold in Salvadoran society.   
Although addressed more thoroughly in upcoming sections, 
it is necessary at this point to address the requirement that the 
persecution must exist independently of the harm inflicted. To 
clarify, the proposed social group is not “victims of domestic 
violence,” but rather women who are inherently vulnerable to abuse 
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at the hands of an intimate partner because of deeply embedded 
societal norms. The second-generation laws in Latin America 
underscore the fact that women in general are more vulnerable to 
abuse because a number of social conditions exist to “exacerbate 
violence against them.”109 In short, laws codifying victim rights and 
protections give female domestic violence victims the social 
distinction required for particular social group status because such 
laws are proof that society recognizes the “unique vulnerability” of 
women to suffer violence at the hands of a current or former intimate 
partner.110 
 
C. Victims’ Rights Laws Reinforce Immutability 
 
Victims’ rights laws serve to reinforce the requirement that 
applicants for asylum based on membership in a particular social 
group must show that members of that group share a common 
“immutable” characteristic.111 An immutable characteristic is that 
which an individual cannot, or at least should not be forced to, 
change.112 Gender is immutable because the characteristic of being 
a woman cannot be changed.113 Many victims’ rights laws serve to 
reinforce the immutability of gender and the accompanying 
vulnerabilities that make women more susceptible to persecution on 
account of their gender. In particular, the victims’ rights laws 
criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C) 
underscore many of the inevitable vulnerabilities that women and 
girls face. FGM/C is defined as “any partial or total removal of the 
external female genitalia or any other injury of the female genital 
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organs for nonmedical reasons.”114 The United States, along with 
many other countries, consider FGM/C a violation of women’s 
rights because of the physical and psychological trauma it produces 
on women and girls.115 In 1996, the United States enacted a special 
provision as part of the IIRAIRA, making it a federal crime to 
perform FGM/C in the United States on girls under the age of 
eighteen.116 The legislation specifically recognized that there is no 
exception for performing FGM/C because of tradition or culture.117 
In addition, at least thirty-five states have adopted legislation 
criminalizing FGM/C.118 
In 2004, the 6th Circuit granted asylum to a victim of FGM/C 
based on her membership in a particular social group defined as 
“young women of the Tchamba-Kunsunte tribe who have not had 
FGM/C, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”119 
In the years since Abay v. Ashcroft, many courts have declined to 
follow this decision. Despite this pushback, in 2016, USCIS issued 
a policy memorandum recognizing FGM/C as a potential ground for 
asylum based on membership in a particular social group.120 
Considering this new policy initiative, several implications come to 
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mind for asylum-seeking victims of domestic violence. First, this 
policy memorandum indicates a potential pattern in asylum law 
whereby the federal government enacts federal legislation 
criminalizing the harm (The Female Genital Mutilation Act) and 
then several decades later, upon realizing the broader human rights 
concerns related to that harm, the government expands the scope of 
protection to refugees who have suffered that same harm (i.e., the 
policy memorandum). The natural parallel that comes to mind is the 
enactment of VAWA, recognizing the public and private depravity 
of domestic violence. The natural progression is for the United 
States to expand the scope of asylum law to protect domestic 
violence victims. Likewise, the exponential growth of the victims’ 
rights movement through the passage of Marsy’s Law and the like 
will have an inevitable impact on views of domestic violence as a 
serious human rights violation. 
Additionally, FGM/C laws support the idea that “women” 
should be recognized as a particular social group. FGM/C in 
particular is a practice of extreme discrimination that only affects 
women, and therefore, victims merely belong to the particular social 
group of “women.”121 While the immutability of “gender” is hardly 
in dispute, the idea of conferring particular social group status to the 
entire social group of “women” raises concerns about the third and 
final requirement for particular social group status, which mandates 
that the social group in question be defined with sufficient 
“particularity.” With social distinction and immutability satisfied, 
this article now turns to address the particularity requirement.   
 
D. Victims’ Rights Laws Create “Particularity” 
 
Victims’ rights laws encapsulate the vulnerabilities inherent 
in being a woman that make women a sufficiently particularized 
social group eligible for asylum. The now infamous dicta of Matter 
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of A-B- declared that a particular social group must not be “too broad 
to have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger 
significance in society.”122 While the Attorney General does not 
provide clarity on how to meet this ambiguous standard, he does 
assert that  “[s]ocial groups defined by their vulnerability to private 
criminal activity likely lack the particularity requirement” for 
asylum as “broad swaths of society may be susceptible to 
victimization.”123 Here, Sessions seems to indicate that domestic 
violence victims do not meet the particularity requirement because 
they fall within the social group of “private crime victims.”124 
However, victims of domestic violence, particularly women 
protected by victims’ rights laws and possessing some additional 
immutable vulnerability, represent a social group beyond their status 
as victims of private crime. Most notably, Sessions fails to address 
the plausible argument that gender is a sufficiently particularized 
social group.125 Although A-B- reiterates that “not every ‘immutable 
characteristic’ is sufficiently precise to define a particular social 
group,” it does not explicitly address whether gender or sex are 
sufficiently precise immutable characteristics.126 It is not clear 
whether this omission is because Sessions rejects the factual reality 
that women can be the targets of domestic violence on account of 
their gender, or because the attorney general believes that women as 
a population is too broad on its face to meet this standard. 
Nevertheless, the special protection needs of women and girls, 
indicated by the wave of victims’ rights legislation described above, 
weigh in favor of gender or sex being a sufficiently particularized 
immutable characteristic.   
First, victims’ rights laws are proof that women are often 
persecuted because of the fact that they are women. This reality is 
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demonstrated in the emergence of laws criminalizing “femicide,” 
which is the murder of a woman or girl because of the fact that she 
is a woman.127 Nearly every country in Latin America (with the 
exceptions of Cuba and Haiti) has adopted legislation criminalizing 
femicide.128 Therefore, Latin American culture recognizes not only 
that women can be persecuted and targeted because of their gender, 
but they are targeted at an alarming rate. Additionally, one need not 
look beyond the rampant culture of “machismo” that permeates 
Latin American culture and inspired the victims’ rights movement 
in the region to accept the fact that women, particularly in Latin 
American society, are the targets of persecution because of their 
gender.129 “Machismo” is a culture of male dominance that 
exacerbates violence against women and defines male sexual culture 
in terms of dominion and control.130 In a machismo society, men 
often exercise their status as the dominant figures in society through 
violence against women.131 Men are then able to target women 
because, as women, they lack control over their own sexuality.132 
Therefore, most female victims of violence in a machismo society 
are persecuted because of the fact that they are women and, 
therefore, seen as lesser. It is worth noting that in Footnote 9 of 
Matter of A-B-, Sessions explicitly declined to recognize the value 
of “conclusory assertions of countrywide negative cultural 
stereotypes” such as cultures of machismo, specifically as they 
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pertain to the particularity requirement.133 Sessions criticized Matter 
of A-R-C-G for basing its analysis of machismo culture on an 
“unsourced partial quotation from a news article eight years ago.”134 
However, the extensive research that has been conducted into 
machismo culture in the years since      A-R-C-G- was handed down 
serves to debunk Sessions’ lack of appropriate evidence argument 
on this topic.  
Once it is accepted that women are often targeted because of 
the fact that they are women, it becomes clear that the social group 
of women is sufficiently particularized by the existence of victims’ 
rights laws. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) Handbook “explicitly identif[ies] ‘sex’ as an ‘innate 
characteristic’ on which a social group claim might be based.”135 
Moreover, UNHCR recognizes women as a “clear example of a 
social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics. . . and 
who are frequently treated differently than men.”136 The argument 
that “women” as a social group is not particularized enough to 
constitute a cognizable social group merely reflects a lack of 
understanding of the centuries of gender norms that have confined 
women, particularly in Latin America, to a consistently persecuted 
social group.   
The second-generation laws that emerged out of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará typify vulnerable classes of women 
based on other immutable characteristics such as ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, national origin, age group, socioeconomic status, 
marital status, or disability.137 Such laws evidence society’s 
understanding that even within the diverse social group of “women,” 
there are distinct particularities that make most women targets for 
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persecution based on their gender.138 Moreover, Grace v. Whitaker 
reiterates that the nexus standard allows for “mixed motives” of 
persecution, “so long as the one central reason for persecution is a 
protected ground.”139 Therefore in the context of these second-
generation laws which foresee the intersection of gender and other 
circumstances contributing to an increased likelihood of 
persecution, the asylum-seeker who was targeted because she was a 
woman, albeit a poor or married woman, meets the nexus 
requirement.   
While this argument is often rejected as too broadly 
expanding the scope of the Refugee Convention so as to impose 
upon states obligations to which they did not consent, I posit that 
expanding the scope of the refugee convention to include women as 
a protected class is not without merit. The world has seen numerous 
instances of grave human rights violations where victims were 
targeted because of their race, religion or nationality, and 
nevertheless the victims held the majority population in the country 
or region.  For example, the South African Apartheid of the 1950’s 
involved country-wide persecution against black South Africans, 
who held the majority population by a landslide.140 Under the 
convention, the United States would not refuse the black victims of 
apartheid asylum because their classification as black South 
Africans was not particularized enough. For the many reasons put 
forth in this section, gender is a sufficiently particularized social 
group that satisfies the particularity pillar of the asylum criteria.    
 
V. ADDRESSING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Government Must Be “Unwilling or Unable” To 
Protect 
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Even where victims’ rights laws are present, governments 
may still prove unwilling or unable to protect victims of domestic 
violence. Where the alleged persecutor in an asylum claim is 
unaffiliated with the government, the applicant must show that her 
government is “unwilling or unable to protect her.”141 The applicant 
cannot rely solely on the fact that the government “[has] difficulty 
controlling the behavior,”  but rather they must show that the 
government has “a complete helplessness to protect the victim.” 142 
Therefore, a fundamental flaw arises if countries have laws in place 
that effectively protect domestic violence victims because then the 
government may be willing and able to protect that individual.  The 
reality though, is that these laws, although demonstrative of 
particularity and social distinction, lack the efficacy and 
implementation needed to impale an otherwise viable asylum claim. 
Victims of domestic violence should not be precluded from 
qualifying for asylum merely because there are laws in place that 
recognize them as rights bearers, where the government has proven 
it is unwilling or unable to effectuate these protections. 
Despite the wave of legislation that has hit Latin America in 
an attempt to combat gender-based violence, enforcement of these 
laws remains obsolete.143 Although there may be “legal stock” 
available to citizens in Latin America to achieve justice through 
private prosecution or other means, the region has nevertheless 
“become known for lacking institutions that uphold the rule of law 
and protect human rights.”144 Even where international, regional, 
and domestic legislation is in place to champion victims’ rights, 
cultural norms such as machismo pose a significant barrier to 
protection, safety, justice, and enforcement for women. Author 
Verónica Michel eloquently describes the balance between 
widespread impunity and how having “rights on the books” still 
matters in countries where enforcement is ineffective or obsolete.145 
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In analyzing the role of private prosecution in Guatemala, Chile, and 
Mexico, Michel never strays from the reality that these states, and 
many states in Latin America, have a high degree of structural 
impunity that makes access to justice for victims nearly 
unattainable.146 Nevertheless, Michel posits that with the 
appropriate resources and support, the existence of private 
prosecution on the books is a means by which victims may have 
improved access to justice.147 
The uniquely intimate nature of domestic violence and the 
inevitably high rates of underreporting make it difficult to determine 
both the prevalence and the rates of investigation and prosecution. 
Anecdotally, many women like Eliza, that I encountered at the U.S. 
southern border, reported they either went to the police themselves, 
or knew someone who did, and the police did not do anything to 
help them. One comprehensive study of violence against women in 
Latin America found that the percentage of women who reported 
physical or sexual violence by a partner ranged from 17% in the 
Dominican Republic up to 53.3% in Bolivia.148 The same study 
conducted an analysis of women who sought help and asked women 
why they did not seek help for intimate partner violence. The study 
shows that the percentage of women who sought help from the 
police, court, or other protection agency ranged from 6.5% in 
Ecuador in 2004 to 27.1% in Jamaica in 2008/9.149 For women who 
experienced intimate partner violence in the past 12 months, the 
most common reasons that women gave for not seeking help 
included: the belief that they could solve it on their own; belief that 
help was “unnecessary” or violence was “normal”; fear of retaliation 
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from their partner; shame; and lack of trust of anyone else.150 
Although these numbers are not necessarily indicative of the exact 
percentages of domestic violence cases that go unreported or 
uninvestigated by local governments, these studies and anecdotal 
experiences underscore the cultural reality of machismo that renders 
government protection nonexistent. Furthermore, although thirty-
two out of thirty-three Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
made a commitment to protect victims of gender-based violence 
through the ratification of the Convention of Belém do Par, only two 
countries have enacted specific national action plans on domestic 
violence as of 2016.151 A national action plan is a policy instrument 
that “seeks to regulate and operationalize merely declarative 
laws.”152 In other words, national action plans give substantive 
enforcement power to the existing laws that otherwise operate 
merely as a means of identifying and grouping a common class of 
victims.  
Therefore, it is the existence of victims’ rights laws that 
indicate society recognizes a certain population of people as socially 
distinct and particularized, but the lack of enforcement of such laws 
within the criminal justice system overcomes the argument that the 
government in these countries is willing and able to protect such 
social groups.  
 
B. Particular Social Group Must Exist Independently of 
the Harm Inflicted  
 
In Matter of A-B-, Sessions found that “El Salvadoran 
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where 
they have children in common” was not a particular social group, in 
part, because the particular social group “must exist independently 
of the harm asserted” in the asylum application.153 Thus, crime 
victims cannot define their particular social group based on the 
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crime that has been executed against them. Sessions reasons that in 
domestic violence cases, the abuser does not target his partner 
because of the fact that she is a married woman unable to leave her 
relationship, rather, he targets her “because of his preexisting 
personal relationship with the victim.”154 This reading of domestic 
violence claims neglects the fact that male abusers do in fact target 
their partners because they are women and because they are trying 
to reinforce the patriarchal power structure of their relationship.155 
Therefore, social groups for gender-based violence need not be 
defined in terms of the harm experienced. Gender alone is a 
sufficiently particularized and cognizable group that is recognized 
in many societies, particularly in Latin America, as a group that is 
inherently vulnerable to certain acts of violence. In fact, in a rare 
moment of concession, Sessions recognizes that “there may be 
exceptional circumstances when victims of private criminal activity 
could meet [the nexus] requirements.”156 Therefore, although 
domestic violence is arguably considered “private criminal 
activity,” it is also a form of persecution based on the woman’s 
gender that independently meets the nexus requirement.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In the United States, intimate partner violence is responsible 
for 15% of all violent crime.157 That is a staggering statistic in a 
nation that purportedly values gender equality. To categorically 
deny all victims of domestic violence from seeking asylum in the 
United States is to deny that there is a gendered power disparity in 
society which causes women to disproportionately experience 
violence on account of their gender. Women face power disparities 
all around the world that make them inherently vulnerable to abuse. 
The World Health Organization estimates that nearly a third of all 
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women worldwide who have been in a relationship have 
experienced some form of intimate partner violence.158 Without 
discounting the experiences of men who also experience domestic 
violence at the hands of women, the fact is that women experience 
such abuse at a much higher rate than men.159 
The Refugee Act extends asylum protection to members of 
a “particular social group” because the drafters knew they could not 
predict every form of persecution that would inevitably exist in the 
decades to come. In the middle of the twentieth century, domestic 
corporal punishment was still recognized as socially acceptable in 
many developed countries around the world.  At that time, the 
drafters could not have predicted that gender-based domestic 
violence would lead to such widespread persecution against women. 
The “particular social group” provision was designed to offer 
asylum to newly emerging persecuted populations who remain 
unprotected by their own government. The existence of victims’ 
rights laws coupled with their lack of efficacy, particularly in Latin 
America, indicates that domestic violence victims are a recognized 
social group that governments are unwilling and unable to protect. 
Recognizing the need to analyze cases on an individual 
basis, the existence of victims’ rights laws is just one of many 
arguments to be made in favor of granting victims of domestic 
violence particular social group status. Nevertheless, the emergence 
of the victims’ rights movement and the particularity with which 
such laws protect victims of domestic and gender-based violence is 
an astounding testament to the social distinction, immutability, and 
particularity of this social group of women who are uniquely 
vulnerable to domestic abuse.  
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